The Siege of Quebec

and the

Battle of the Plains of Abraham

A Reply

to the Editor of *Old and New*

(TRANSLATION)

BY

N.-E. DIONNE, M. D., Litt. D.

Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada
and Joint Librarian of the Legislature
of the Province of Quebec.

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DUSSAULT & PROULX, PRINT.

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The EDITH *and* LORNE PIERCE
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Queen's University at Kingston

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AND THE

BATTLE OF THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM

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With the Compliments of

N.-E. DIONNE

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SINCE the year 1898, few subjects have been more discussed in literary circles in this city than the Siege of Quebec, which culminated in the Battle of the Plains on the 13th. of September, 1759. Nearly everyone of our literary men has had something to say upon the question, and in my capacity of Librarian of the Legislature of this Province, I was frequently consulted upon some phase of the siege or of the battle.

During the years 1899-1900, and the early part of 1901, when almost every foreign mail brought to Quebec correspondence or documents relating to the period, which were invariably submitted to me, I had unusual opportunities of becoming acquainted with new sources of information, and of appraising the value of the documents placed in my hands with the data with which I was already familiar.

The matter which was thus presented to my notice would fill many large volumes.

When *the Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham* was published in 1902, I was therefore in a measure cognizant with the selection of the documents which are published therein. I therefore at once undertook to review the work, but I soon discovered that there was so much detail in the first three volumes, with which I was not so

well acquainted, that it would be more advantageous to study the subject further.

The portion of the review prepared at this time was kept constantly before me, but it was not until over a year after that my article was finally written, which appeared in *La Revue Canadienne* for the month of May, 1900.

This article was written after the most careful consideration and with full knowledge of the significance of every statement made.

In my opening remarks I said :

"Plusieurs années s'écouleront encore avant qu'on ait pu apprécier la valeur d'un ouvrage dont la préparation n'a été faite que d'après des documents inconnus des écrivains qui se sont occupés de cette courte période de notre histoire. Personne de ceux qui y ont collaboré (Chapais, Parmelee, Chambers) n'a voulu établir de contraste entre les opinions qu'ils émettent et les écrits des autres écrivains ; aussi certains points d'histoire définitivement réglés par cet ouvrage, resteront inaperçus jusqu'à ce qu'on les découvre par la comparaison."

To the reviewer who wishes to do justice to this work, this comparison must be made, however tedious it may prove. I have instituted such a comparison, and the result furnished the foundation of the passage which I have quoted from my review. I believed, with the unusual amount of preparation which I had made, that I was competent to write of the work in question.

The learned editor of *Old and New*, departing from his customary modesty, declares that I am incompetent, and also implies that he himself is especially qualified for the task.

The editor says :

"In fact, to do justice to the labors of Dr.

Doughty and his collaborators, without doing injustice to their predecessors, the reviewer must have not merely a general knowledge of our historians, French and English, but a somewhat detailed acquaintance with the documentary sources of our history. Dr. Dionne, in his praises, furnishes evidence of the need not only of such qualifications but of the faculty of constantly bearing in mind (while reading a new work), what has been already affirmed, indicated or implied by earlier writers. Of the service rendered by the publication of so many attesting documents, including fac similes ; of the gallery of portraits, some of them rare and all beautifully executed ; of the views of noted scenes and houses and other illustrations, and above all, of the maps, charts and diagrams, there can be but one judgment. But it ought to be remembered that, with the exception of a certain number of varying value, the documents in question have been mentioned and utilized by previous historians. ''

The only answer which I can bring to refute the charge of ignorance which is urged against me is by quotations from various well known writers on the subject of the siege, and by making a comparison of the documents published in the volumes reviewed with those which the editor claims are so well known.

I will first refer to the last letters of Wolfe.

There are perhaps no circumstances surrounding the last days of the siege of Quebec about which there have been so much controversy as the selection of the landing place, and the authorship of the plan which led to the reduction of the city.

Parkman, usually well informed and precise, leaves the question open, although he refers to it in more than one place.

Refering to Major Robert Stobo, he writes: "His biographer says that he it was who directed Wolfe in the choice of a landing place. Be this as it may, Wolfe in person examined the shores as far as Pointe-aux-Trembles; till at length landing on the south side, a little above Quebec, and looking across the water with a telescope, he descried a path that ran with a long slope up the face of the woody precipice, and saw at the top a cluster of tents. These were those of Vergor's Guard at Anse-du-Foulon, now called Wolfe's Cove."

Major Moncrief gives us the same information under the date of the 10th.

LeMoine, in *Picturesque Quebec*, makes no reservation about Stobo. He says: "Their landing place at Sillery was selected by Major Robert Stobo."

Now both of these statements concerning Stobo are absurd. There are three contemporary authorities, besides Wolfe himself, to prove that the landing place was selected on the 10th. of September. Now Stobo left Quebec for Crown Point on the morning of the 7th. of September. On the 10th. he was a captive in the hands of the Indians a long way from Quebec, and he did not reach Crown Point until October.

Casgrain, in *Montcalm et Lévis*, p. 202, says: "Ce fut le plan que proposèrent en dernier lieu les trois Brigadiers," and "Dans la dépêche qu'il écrivit, le 2 septembre, au Ministre Pitt, il (Wolfe) disait: "J'ai acquiescé à ce projet."

Warburton states that "The merit of this daring and skillful proposition belongs to Colonel George Townshend." And Wright, who had access to all the known papers of Wolfe, and has given us such a splendid biography of the General, says: "Wolfe's

merit, so far as relates to it, consists in his re-adopting it in deference to the unanimous judgment of his subordinates, and in carrying it out with all his mind, with all his heart, with all his might," and Colonel Townshend, in the preface to *The Military Life of Field Marshal George, First Marquess Townshend*, says: "It will be seen that the unexpected and surprising manner in which Quebec was taken was the plan of the Brigadiers and not of Wolfe."

There is another side to this question. There are writers who, while giving a certain share of the credit to Wolfe, claim that the first idea of landing on the north shore was the Brigadiers. But this is disproved by Wolfe's letter written while on his way from Halifax to Quebec, wherein he said: "I reckon we shall have a smart action at the passage of the St. Charles unless we can steal a detachment up the river St. Lawrence, and land them 3-4-5 miles, or more, above the town.

We might cite other instances, but those given are sufficient to show that these well known writers and accepted authorities had no knowledge either of the letter of the three brigadiers or of the last letters of Wolfe, which dispose of this vexed question forever.

In the pages of the *Siege of Quebec* it is shown that during the latter part of August, Wolfe was too ill to attend to the direction of affairs, and that he asked his Brigadiers to consult for the good of the service. The Brigadiers proposed a plan to which Wolfe agreed, giving his reasons to Saunders for so doing in these words: "My ill state of health hinders me from executing my own plan; it is of too desperate a nature to order others to execute. The generals seem to think alike as to the operations: I therefore join with them." This was on the 1st

of September. On the 8th. of September, Wolfe was better, and able to think of his own plan.

What was the nature of the plan of the Brigadiers, and where was it to have been put into effect ?

In vol. IV of the *Siege*, p. 295, Admiral Holmes furnishes the particulars under the date of the 6th. of September : "A plan was immediately set on foot to attempt a landing about four leagues above the town, and it was ready to put into execution when General Wolfe reconnoitered down the river and fixed upon Foulon."

It will thus be seen that the plan which Wolfe had in his mind was not the plan of the Brigadiers which was to land twelve miles above the town. Admiral Holmes knew at this time that the Foulon was the place, but the Brigadiers did not.

On the morning of the 12th., they wrote this letter to Wolfe :

Copy of a Letter from on Board the Leostoff

Sepr. 12th. 1759

To Gen. WOLFE,

Sir

As we do not think ourselves sufficiently informed of the several parts which may fall to our Share in the execution of the Descent you intend tomorrow, we must beg leave to request from you, as distinct Orders as the nature of the thing will admit of, particularly to the place or places we are to attack. This circumstance (perhaps very decisive) we cannot learn from the public orders, neither may it be in the power of the naval officer who leads the Troops to instruct us. As we should be very sorry, no less for the public than our own sakes, to commit any

mistakes, we are persuaded you will see the necessity of this application, which can proceed from nothing but a desire to execute your Orders with the utmost punctuality.

We are, Sir, etc.,

ROBT. MONCKTON
GEO. TOWNSHEND
JAS. MURRAY.

At half past eight, on the evening of the 12th., Wolfe wrote to Monckton, in reply to the joint letter given above :

" The place is called the Foulon, distant upon 2 miles or 2½ from Quebec..... you will begin to land the men a little of this side of the naked rock." and adds :

" It is not a usual thing to point out in the public orders the direct spot of our attack, nor for any inferiour Officers not charged with a particular duty to ask instructions upon that point. I had the honor to inform you to-day that it is my duty to attack the French army. To the best of my knowledge and abilities, I have fixed upon that spot where we can act with the most force and are most likely to succeed. If I am mistaken, I am sorry for it and must be answerable to His Majesty and the public for the consequences.

I have the honor to be,

Sir, etc.,

JAM : WOLFE."

Sutherland, 8½ o'Clock
12th. Sepr. 1759.

Now it is not reasonable to suppose that if these letters were so well known, as the editor of *Old and New* implies, that writers like Parkman, Warburton, Wright, Kingsford, LeMoine, Townshend, and Casgrain or Garneau, would have ignored them, since they furnish proof over the signature of those most concerned, of the exact spot of the landing place, and also of the authorship of the plan.

From time to time, during a space of over one hundred years, questions have been asked by students through various channels, concerning this question, but no satisfactory answer has been given, and several magazine articles have been devoted to its elucidation, especially since the appearance of Colonel Townshend's book.

In justice to Colonel Townshend, it should be said, however, that since he has seen these letters he has expressed his intention of withdrawing his preface in which he claimed the merit of the plan for the Brigadiers, and in a letter written by him, which I have before me, he says: "I find your criticism of my book just—Wolfe it was who selected the landing—Wolfe deserves the praise."

Townshend's book has been widely circulated, and many have adopted his views as expressed in his preface. Thus the distinguished soldier, Brigadier General Sir H. Wolfe Murray, K.C.B., who has lately been appointed Quartermaster General of India, in writing from Westward Ho! Bengalore, in Sept. 1902, concerning the fortunate discovery of these last letters, says: "I have not read Townshend's book, but I have seen reviews of it, and one of the Indian papers basing itself upon Townshend's text, preached a sort of funeral oration upon Wolfe's reputation".

The authors claim no credit for the discovery,

they state that they were received from the British Museum. The British Museum received them from the Earl of Chichester, and the Earl has informed the authors that he found them in the Newcastle papers. It is therefore manifestly unfair to ridicule the authors for the publication of the letters under the pretext that they were well known and utilized.

Regarding the *Journal of Townshend*, published in Vol. 4, with its exceedingly valuable references, and the splendid plan which accompanies it, whereon the route from the Foulon to the battlefield is traced, I repeat that to the best of my knowledge it was unknown to bibliographers. The late abbé Verreau, who carefully examined the journal and the plan in Quebec, stated that it was unknown to him, and he placed a high value upon it. Mr. Philéas Gagnon has frequently said that he has never met with any mention of it. These two gentlemen are acknowledged authorities, and their opinion is certainly a sufficient justification for the publication of the journal, even if its existence was well known to the Editor of *Old and New*. Colonel Townshend had no knowledge of it, and desired to obtain the original.

The second journal of Townshend, and other papers published in Vol. V, were known to Colonel Townshend, as we find in the note to the journal.

" The originals are in Hownslow Barracks where the present copies were made by permission of Colonel Townshend " .... Colonel Townshend has probably consulted these documents in the preparation of his work."

Many of the papers published in the *Siege* were not made use of by Colonel Townshend, and the journal is published for the first time *in extenso*, and is mentioned by no one also except Colonel Towns-

hend. Even the Historical Manuscripts Commission when they catalogued the Townshend papers, and gave many papers relating to Quebec, did not include this valuable journal and the papers which accompany it. Walpole endeavoured to obtain copies of the papers, but was refused, and when a copyist was sent from London by the authors, to obtain copies of the papers mentioned in the catalogue, although furnished with a letter from the solicitor of the estate, the present Marquis ordered the door of the lumber room when they were kept to be barred up.

The journal and papers are therefore only available in the volumes of the *Siege*, and it would be an exceedingly difficult task to obtain copies of them elsewhere. Colonel Townshend has made a certain use of them, and therefore they are not absolutely new. But let us compare the quotations from the journal made by Townshend in his book with copies of the original.

Under the date of August 8th, we find this passage quoted:

"This morning, an Indian swam over the ford below the falls with the intention, as we supposed, to scalp a sentry, but the sentry saw and ran up to him presenting his piece to his breast. The Indian went down on his knees, threw away his knife and delivered himself up, he was a very savage looking brute and naked—he seemed very apprehensive that we intended to put him to death. Altho' there were several in Camp that spoke Indian language, we could not get him to understand any thing. Most nights we hear the Indians holloaing in the woods all about us." Braggs and the Lt. Infantry ordered to march to-morrow morning on a forageing party. Braggs return this afternoon, they saw some peasants

who fired on them out of a house and wounded five men. 2 marines were found scalpt in the woods this morning."

In the copy made from the original, by an expert copyist of the Public Record office, published in the *Siege* this quotation is under the dates of the 8th., 9th. and 10th. of August, and the question of a date is a matter of importance in tracing the movements of a regiment.

"8th. This Morning an Indian Swam over the Ford below the Falls with an Intention as we supposed to Scalp a Centry, but on the Centry running up to him and presenting his piece to his breast he got down on his knees threw away his knife and deliverd himself up, he was a very savage looking brute & naked he seem'd to be very apprehensive of putting him to Death, altho there was several in the Camp that spoke Indian Language we Cou'd not get him to understand any sort of Languages. Most nights we hear the Indians Hollow in the Woods all about us.

" 9th. At 1 the Morning The Battery from Point St. Pierre set fire to the town it Burnt most part of the Day Consumed a great part of the Lower Town. Braggs & the Light Infantry are under orders to march to-morrow morning early on a Forageing Party, and at the same time the 2 Companies of Grenadrs. of the Royal American Battalions to go down the River in Boats & escort Genl. Wolfe to the Village St. Joachim.

" 10th. Braggs & the Light Infantry return'd in the afternoon and the 3 Companies of Grenadiers at 10 at night they see some peasants who fired on him out of a house and wounded five men.

The Regimts here are out every day a manuvering—And we continue to divert ourselves by firing

our Cannon Hoitzers & Mortars on the French Camp & Village of Beauporte sometimes in the Day and sometimes at Night.

2 Marines was found scalpt in the Woods at Point Levi."

One more example may be given. On page 173, Colonel Townshend quotes this passage :

"We should have had our front to our friends on the Isle of Orleans—our right flank to the enemy ! and a pass under the Falls ! and our rear exposed to the incursions of all the savages they chose to pass over the fords on the Montmorency river to annoy us. However the doubt was not long which of their two camps we should prefer—for a number of their savages rushed down upon us from the rocky woody height, drove a few rangers that were there down to my quarters for refuge wounded both their officers, and in an instant scalped 13 or 14 of their men, and had it not been for Braggs Grenadiers who were in another barn giving to my quarters who attacked the Indians very bravely whilst some inclined round to the right to surround them—they had spread confusion anywhere."

This passage in thus given in the "Siege of Quebec :" "By this position we should have had our Front to our friends on ye. Isle of Orleans—our right Flank to ye. Ennemy & a pass under ye. Falls—& our Rear open to ye. woods & be exposed to ye. Savages They chose to pass over ye. Fords up ye. River to annoy us—However ye. Doubt was not long which of these two Camp we should prefer—for a number of their Savages rushd Suddenly down upon us from ye. Rocky Woody Height I had descr ibed before—drove a few Rangers that were there down to my Quarters for refuge. wounded both their officers in an Instant scalped 13 or 14 of their Men

& had it not been for Murray's Graenadiers who were in a Barn & for Graenadiers who were in another Barn joining to my quarters—ye. latter of of which at tack'd them very bravely whilst ye. other inclined to ye. right to surround them they had Spread Confusion every where—before ye. Graenadiers had time to stand to their Arms one was wounded at my door, another just by it, in this situation we remaind till late in ye. Evening ye. General having placed ye. Regt. upon this attack in Companies with their Front to ye. side ye. Enemy could only attack us, having no orders to entrench."

We do not blame Colonel Townshend for improving the *Journal of the Brigadier*, but when he cites a passage carefully enclosed within quotation marks, we would prefer that it should agree with the original.

In the year 1868, the Literary and Historical Society published a reprint of *A Journal of the Epedition up the River St. Lawrence* copied from the *New York Mercury* of December 31st, 1759. To this journal there was a note by Mr. James M. LeMoine setting forth that the publication possesses "marked value in a historical point of view, and affords a clear, though succint account of the devastation inflicted by the invading army on the fertile parishes on both shores of the St. Lawrence, in the vicinity of Quebec."

This journal has been made use of and referred to by many writers.

A Jonrnal of the Expedition up the River St. Lawrence, published in Boston one month before the *Mercury* copy, is also published in the *Siege*. It is by the Sergeant Major of Hopkin's Regiment.

We make no comment on the relative merits of

the two journals, but by quotations from the two, demonstrate that the journal published in the *Siege*, which was obtained from the Librarian of Congress, has in a large measure the features of a new discovery, and notwithstanding the fact that it bears the same title as the journal in the transactions of the Literary and Historical Society, it is not the one with which we have been familiar with for so many years, and that it has not been utilized, as the Editor of *Old and New* alleges.

The following extract is from the journal published by the Literary and Historical Society :

"The 25th, the Louisbourg bataillon and three more companies of light infantry, went round the Island of Orleans. The 27th. they arrived again at the camp, and received the news that our forces on Montmorency side had been attacked the day before, and had got the better of the enemy, in which, 'twas said, they had 300 kill'd, the rest wounded. The same day went to get the plunder which was discover'd on the march round the Island, consisting chiefly of wearing apparel, and some cash. The same night the French sent down five fire floats, which were tow'd ashore by the men-of-war's boats, where they were burnt without doing our shipping any damage."

The following is an extract from the Journal bearing the same title, published in *The Siege of Quebec*.

July 25th, the *Louisbourg* Battalion and three more Companies of Grenadiers, with 3 Companies of Light-Infantry, went round the Island of *Orleans*. —The 27th we arrived at our Camp ; and we receiv'd News That our Forces on *Montmorancy* Side had been attack'd the Day before, and likewise got the Better of the Enemy ; we had an Account that we

kill'd 300 of them, but the Number of wounded none of us could tell : Our loss was 5 Officers and 32 Privates, 12 of whom were kill'd and the rest wounded. The same Day we went out to get Plunder, which we discovered on our March round the Island, consisting of Gowns, Shifts, Petticoats, Stockings, Coats and Waistcoats, Breeches, Shoes, and many other Articles too tedious to mention and some Cash : which, if the Things had been sold to the Value, would have fetch'd upwards of 500 l. Sterl. The same Night the *French* sent five Fire-Floats down, which made great Confusion among our Fleet ; but the Men of War sent their Boats and tow'd them ashore, where they burnt out without further Damage."

Under the date of the 11th. of Aug. the Journal published by the Society contains this passage :

"The 11th there was an engagement between our Scouting-Parties and the Indians : our people drove them off ; we had several killed and wounded."

Under the same date in the *Siege*, we have this entry :

"The 11th Instant there was an Engagement between our Scouting Parties and the *Indians* ; our People drove them off ; we had a great Number wounded, several very badly, but the most slightly ; there was but few kill'd : There was one of the 35th Reg. told me, he saw an *Indian* who fir'd at him, but miss'd him ; that he levelled his Piece and fir'd at the *Indian* and miss'd him likewise ; upon which the *Indian* immediately threw his Tommahawk at him and miss'd him ; whereupon the Soldier, catching up the Tommahawk, threw it at the *Indian* and levell'd him ; and then went to scalp him ; but 2 other *Indians* came behind him, and one of them stuck a Tommahawk in his Back ; but did not

wound him so much as to prevent his Escape from them."

One more extract from this Journal must suffice:

"The enemy lost in the engagement, Lieutenant General Montcalm, who had three wounds from our six-pounder grape, of which he died next day; one colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, and at least 1500 officers and men killed and wounded, and 200 taken prisoners at their very sally ports, of which many were officers. We lost the brave Gen. Wolfe, who received three wounds, but had the satisfaction before his death to see his own plan so executed to as to beat the enemy totally: He then said "I thank God, now shall I die contented" were his last words. Brigadier General Monckton; Col. Carlton, Quarter master general; Major Berry, adjutant general, and several other officers were wounded."

The passage under the same date is thus given in *The Siege:*

"The Enemy lost in the Engagement, Lieut. Gen. *Montcalm*, (who was torn to Pieces by our Grape-Shot) 2 Brigadier-Generals; one Colonel; 2 Lieutenant-Colonels; and at least 130 Officers and Men kill'd and 200 taken Prisoners at their very Sally-Ports, of which 58 were Officers. On our Side was killed the brave and never to be forgotten General WOLFE; with 9 Officers, 4 Serjeants and 44 Privates; wounded, Brigadier-General *Monckton;* Colonel *Carlton*, Quarter-Master-General; Major *Barre*, Adjutant General; and 50 other Officers, with 26 Serjeants and 557 Privates.—This Action was the more glorious, as the Enemy were at least 12,000 strong, besides 500 Horse; whereas we, at the utmost, did not consist of above 3500, some of whom did not engage;—for at the Time of the Engagement Colonel *Scott* was out burning the Country with 1600

Men: Col. *Burton* was at Point-*Levee* with 2000 Men; and on the Island of *Orleans* there were 1500; whereas our whole Army, at our first embarking at *Louisbourg*, did not exceed 8240 Men."

The Literary and Historical Society did well in publishing the copy from the Newspaper, but had Mr. LeMoine known of the existence of the original journal, he would not have printed the abreviated version. In publishing the original, the authors of the *Siege* have given us a more complete narrative, and they also give the authorship of the journal, which was unknown to Mr. LeMoine.

Some time in the year 1901, a deputation from the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, headed by Sir James LeMoine, waited upon the government for the purpose of asking assistance in the publication of the Journal of Quartermaster Sergeant Johnson, a copy of which was in manuscript in the Archives at Ottawa, and had never been published. The deputation very properly pointed out the value of this Journal, and it is a matter of regret that it was not published by the Society.

The Journal of Quartermaster Sergeant Johnson was eventually published in *The Siege*.

The Editor of *Old & New* would imply that because this Journal is alleged to be in Ottawa, it is well known, and there is no merit in the publication in the pages of *The Siege*.

Let us, however, compare the Journal in Ottawa with the original in the possession of Francis Parkman, of Boston, of which it is said to be a duplicate, in the handwriting of Johnson.

In the journal in Ottawa we find this passage:

"They told him it was not the Regulars but the Canadians and Indians whom it was not in the power of discipline to restrain. General Wolfe

whose spirit was too big to bear a repulse with any degree of the moderation, &c., &c."

In the place of this meagre passage, we find the following lengthy description, occupying two pages and a half in the journal which is published in the *Siege*:

"They told him that it was not done by the Regulars; nor by any order, but it was done by the irregular Canadians and Indians, who give ear to no rules, nor was it in their power to restrain them.

"Let us in this place take a View of General Wolfe's prospect, and the advantages,—which was to have attended the due execution of it, and we shall find the Sum total after due consideration to stand a—

"First, he considered that all our Artillery might be used to effect:—Second, that All the troops could have acted in Concert:—and, Third, that in case of any miscarriage a Retreat to Montmorenci, would at certain times be open at the Ford, on the beach, below the Fall.—

"Let us next take a retrospective prospect on the several, and weighty considerations which rise up in opposition to the said plan, and they will stand thus:—As First, the Enemy were posted on a Steep commanding eminence:—The Beach on which we were was covered with Slimy Mud, exceeding Slippery, and broken into deep holes:—the eminence where the Enemy were, was deeply entrenched, and exceeding steep, and in most places seemed impracticable to us, who were below upon the beach.—Again, the Enemy were very numerous, and maintained such a severe Musquetry upon us from those intrenchments, that if the attempt had succeeded according to the General's expectations, our loss must have been very great, and that of the Enemy

very inconsiderable ; as they could have disputed every inch of gronnd between that and the town ; about four English miles ; after all, there was the River Saint Charles must be passed, (if they would permit us) before we could make any attempt upon the town,—Again. Let us consider further, and we shall soon find the impracticability, nay, I may say the impossibility of ever making good the work we had in hand, that is the taking Quebec on that side the water :—Again, had it even proved successful, and we had forced them to quit those intrenchments which they then occupied : Nay, had the Grenadiers obeyed their instructions to the greatest punctuality, and formed into four distinct Bodies as they were directed ; they would not have lost one man less than they did ; nor could them have kept themselves from the distress they were in by the time Brigadier Monckton's troops were all landed, and formed on the Beach ; and that Brigadier Townshend had arrived from Montmorenci ; as their Orders was, first, to Storm those Batteries, and Redoubts which lay in the road up, and below the intrenchments on the hill ; they would all the while they were doing this been exposed to the same Musquetry, which they had in that iregular manner they were in, when the confusion happened among them :—Nay, had they waited on the Beach, till the whole Army were Joined, and the whole acted as one man, and begun the Assault ; and by so doing had taken possession of those works at Beauport ; which we laboured so hard after, what an infinite number of men must we have had killed and wounded :—Again, if we had gained these intrenchments, how must we have maintained them ; all the Flower of our Army, both Officers and Men would have been cut off ; either killed, or so badly wound-

ed, as not to have been fit for the Field, any more—this Campaign, if Ever ; from whence must we get fresh men to fill up those Vacancies, and enable us to carry on the work."

"Again, Let us turn our eyes and take a cursory glance of the Situation of the Enemy, and we shall find them on a Steep commanding eminence, deeply and double intrenched, and traversed with Redoubts ; a rough, rocky road up to them ; which appeared to us on the beach below, past all possibility of Access : entirely out of the reach of our fire, and all the while exposed to such a heavy musquetry from them, that most of our Army must have been cut off in the Attempt ; and the remainder have fallen a Sacrifice to the merciless and inhuman Savages :—Again, had the Enemy quitted those intrenchments, after they had killed most of our men ; they could easily have taken the remainder prisoners ; by sending round a detachment by the upper Ford, and have Siezed our Camp at Montmorenci, and cut off our retreat by the Ford below the Fall ; and which was the last recourse we had to trust to ; they might have taken our heavy train of Artillery planted on the point of the Fall, and employed them against us, and either scoured us out of our new habitation, or else obliged us to keep it so close, as not dare to lift a hand against them, and in a very short time make us all Prisoners of War.—Again, suppose we had gained the heights of Beauport, and had brought up our Artillery, as there was nobody there could see the least shew of Possibility ; they were equally provided with Artillery with ourselves ; the whole road between Beauport and the River Saint Charles was nothing else but one intrenchment at the back of another ; with Adverse Traverses, Redoubts, and Batteries of Cannon and Mortars ; (as we afterwards

found when we became Masters of the place). Such a numerous Army in our front to support those works; besides their boundless number of Savage Indians, and Canadians in the wood on our flank to harrass us day and night, that we should not have been able to support ourselves under the Fatigue; Again, had we even gained the River Saint Charles, as that was a thing impossible; we should then have been exactly in the same situation with Brigadier Monckton at Point de Levi; had an impassible River between us and the town, as he had: indeed we might have Bombarded the North Side of the Town, and reduced it to a heap of Rubbish, as he had done the South side:—Besides all this, on the South side the River Saint Charles is a level open Plain between that and Quebec, about an English mile in breadth; where the enemy would have intrenched themselves and supported it with Batteries, and defended it to the last extremity; and have secured every fordable place up that River, as they did that up the River Montmorenci, with Redoubts and Batteries of Cannon: there also we lay open to being continually harrassed in our Rear, and on our flanks by the savage parties from the Woods.—"

"General Wolfe, whose spirit was too great to bear the least repulse, with any degree of moderation."

Thinking that possibly the copyist in Ottawa had omitted this lenghty passage in the copy which was obtained from the Department some years ago, the manuscript was sent to Ottawa to be compared with the original, and it has been returned recently, with the assurance that it is a correct copy of the original.

We will give one more example of variation.

In the Ottawa Journal we read:

"On the eighth of July, in a Council of War, it was resolved to send two ships of war, two armed sloops, with some transports with troops on board, to make a diversion on the other side of the town, and if possible to draw the attention of the enemy that way from their present situation at Beauport. The general went himself with this little armament, and observed minutely the banks of the river, and searching with the greatest diligence and circumspection for a convenient place where he could land his troops, but after all he could not find the least encouragement to attempt a landing ; he found the banks all the way lined with such multitudes of troops, and so situated that they could not be forced : as also that the ascent up the banks between the town and Cape Rouge, were everywhere, not only difficult, but extremely dangerous. However at all events let the consequence be what it would, he ordered Colonel Carleton to land with a small body of troops at Point au Tremble and not without success ; for we made some prisoners and sustained a very inconsiderable loss. To this place a vast number of the rich inhabitants had retired from Quebec as soon as general Monckton began to open his batteries upon the town and took along with them the most valuable of their effects. In this sham expedition the general had no previous expectation to make any advantage of consequence ; his main view was to endeavour to draw away the enemy's attention from his main object ; but upon examination that they were in all places as well above the town, as at Beauport, ready to give him a reception, he therefore returned back to the camp at Montmorenci."

In the journal published in the *Siege*, this passage reads as follows :

" On the Eighth of July, in a Council of War it was resolved, to send two ships of War, two Armed Sloops, and some transports with troops on board; to make a diversion on the other side of the town; and to endeavor as much as possible to draw off the attention of the enemy from Beauport; as expecting the that General Montcalm would follow him up the River with his Army, and by that means leave his present Object open to him, whereby he might the easier become possessed of that, so much desired Situation:

" —He went himself in person, on this Sham Expedition, that he might find out as much as possible, the nature of their Situation on that side of the town: He observed minutely the banks of the River, and searched diligently for a convenient place were troops could be landed, with any view of success:—He also viewed particularly the strength of their Army in those parts, as also, as far as he was able, how they were stationed: and after the most careful and minute examination he found the banks all the way lined with such a multitude of troops, that it was not in his power to force through them; and the Ascent up the banks between Quebec and Cape Rouge, were everywhere not only difficult but extremely dangerous: However he ordered Colonel Carleton to land with a Body of troops at point au tremble, thinking by that means to draw off their attention from his object at Beauport, and therefore, enable him to prosecute his favorite Scheme: but all this was to no purpose, no motion being made at Beauport on this account; At this place we made some prisoners, and sustained very little loss:—When Brigadier Monckton opened his Batteries against the town, a great number of the most

eminent of the inhabitants had fled thither with the most valuable of their Effects.—

" After General Wolfe had returned to Montmorenci, from the above Sham expedition he began to work his brain how he could possibly make good his favorite plan, of getting possession of the Beauport side of the River Montmorenci :—He saw,— and well knew now, that the Enemy was very numerous, and that they were posted everywhere to the greatest advantage against him ; and that they had no occasion to weaken one place to support another. And seeing no likelihood of General Amherst's coming to his assistance, as he had been led to expect he would, he therefore came to this Resolution : to attack the Enemy in their trenches at Beauport, let the consequence be what it would.— "

There can be no question as to which version of the Journal the student could prefer, and he can only find the complete copy in the pages of the *Siege of Quebec*. This is another example of the necessity of being familiar not only with the titles of documents but also with their contents. The process of comparison is laborious, and we cannot expect every critic to take this course. When he does not however, he should be cautious in his statements.

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In the course of my review I said :

" Plusieurs seront surpris d'apprendre que lorsque Cadet, sorti de prison, eut restitué les six millions qu'il avait volés, il était encore assez riche pour acheter la Baronie de la Touche d'Avrigny, et qu'il devint un noble de la Vieille France. Ce fut Vandreuil qui l'aida à atteindre une aussi haute position."

On this paragraph the Editor of *Old and New* makes the following comment:

"A good many," says Dr. Dionne, "will be surprised to learn that after Cadet, on his release from prison, had restored the six millions that he had stolen, he was still rich enough to purchase the barony of La Touche d'Avrigny, and that he became a *noble de la vieille France.* And it was Vaudreuil who helped him to attain that high position," "Now Dussieux not only told us this years and years ago, but he let us know why it was that Cadet was so well off in spite of his crushing sentence. Cadet, who had been "munitionnaire général des vivres," or commissary-general, in Canada, was one of the twenty-one accused ex-officials who, out of the whole number of fifty-five, ventured to appear before the lieutenant-general, and the twenty-seven judges, his assessors, at the Chatelet. On the 10th. of December, 1763, judgment was rendered. Bigot was condemned to perpetual exile, confiscation of property, a fine of 1,000 livres, and 1,500,000 restitution. Varin had a like sentence, save that his restitution money was only 800,000 livres. Penissault, "Corpron and Maurin had each to restore 600,000 livres. But Cadet, whose sentence was to be banished from Paris for nine years and to pay a fine of 500 livres, was called upon to make restitution of 6,000,000 livres—four times as great a sum as that which Bigot had to surrender. In a footnote Dussieux gives the reason of the disproportion. Cadet, he says, had claims against the Government to the amount of ten or eleven millions and, after examination, this debt was allowed to balance his defalcation. Soulavie is the authority for this explanation."

I have a copy of the second edition of Dussieux before me (Paris 1862) and I fail to find in the

volume one word relating to the three points upon which I dwelt, namely: 1. That Cadet purchased the barony de la Touche d'Avigny; 2. that he became a noble of old France; 3. that he was helped to this position by Vaudreuil.

I find, however, this sentence made use of by Dussieux: "Cadet réclamait au gouvernement 10 ou 11 millions qui lui étaient dus; pour être quitte, on le réhabilita.—SOULAVIE."

Now, there is nothing in these words even to imply that Cadet became the purchaser of the barony or that he became a noble of France, or that he was assisted to that honour by Vaudreuil.

The statement quoted by Dussieux on the authority of Soulavie, is of no value whatever. The discovery of the numerous documents relating to Cadet prove exactly the reverse.

Cadet was released from the Bastile under the following authority:

"(5 mars 1764.)

"EXTRAIT DES LETTRES DE GRACE

"Sa Majesté....., prévoyant combien la présence du dit Cadet peut importer à notre service et même lui être nécessaire relativement à la liquidation des dépenses faites en Canada, pour la partie dont le dit sieur Cadet étoit chargé.....

"C'est pourquoi nous avons, de notre grâce spéciale, pleine puissance et autorité royale, quitté et déchargé, quittons et déchargeons par les présentes signées de notre main, le dit Joseph Cadet de la peine du bannissement à laquelle il a été condamné par le jugement du 10 décembre dernier, nous réservant de faire valoir, comme ainsi que nous l'avise-

rons bon être, la condamnation prononcée contre le dit Cadet en restitution de la somme de six millions .....''

We see by a document that Cadet actually paid these six millions into the Treasury, but notwithstanding this an order in Council was passed on the 25th. of December, 1764, declaring his debt to the State to be 11 millions.

Now it was not until the 20th. of January, 1767, that Cadet purchased the baronie de la Touche d'Avrigny.

On the 20th. of January, 1770, he obtained "lettres de terrier," which, according to usage, were read "à haute et intelligible voix à la grande porte de chacune des églises des paroisses de la Baronnie : Nancré, Saint-Martin, de Quinlieu, Avrigny et Saint-Gervais."

The property was extensive as we find by this document :

"Notre bien-aimé, Joseph Cadet, seigneur de la baronnie de la Touche d'Avrigny au Poitou, des fief et seigneurie de Marigny sous Marmande, du château, terres et seigneuries de Mondon, Ponsay, Bouquilli et les Pruneaux, etc."

The title of noblesse was not in this case confirmed until eleven years after. Thus on the 25th. of Feb. 1777, we find this document, the petition of which was granted in 1778 ; and it was at this time that Vaudreuil assisted Cadet to obtain his desire.

"Aveu et dénombrement du fief, terre et seigneurie d'Avrigny la Touche, sous la qualification pure et simple de haute, moyenne et basse justice seulement, et sans que le dit Joseph Cadet puisse lui attribuer le titre de baronnie, sauf à lui à se pouvoir par devers

Sa Majesté pour obtenir des lettres d'érection ou de confirmation du dit titre de baronnie."

In 1767, Cadet claimed that there were 9 millions due to him by the government and wishing to place his capital to advantage he bought the chateau de la Barbelinière, in which he lived. After Cadet had paid in the six millions, one of his claims for goods in 1756 was allowed to the extent of five millions, four hundred thousand livres, but as this was payable in letters of exchange in London, he did not receive anything like this amount. Cadet became involved and after a long process of litigation, his property was sold in 1791 and 1792.

There is no mention of anything of what I have quoted in the work of Dussieux.

This method of examination might be applied with advantage to many of the documents published in the *Siege*, such for instance as "The Bougainville correspondence" in Ottawa. Copies of these letters were obtained and printed, but after they were compared with the originals in France, by the owner, they were found to contain over 1,500 mistakes.

It is true that these letters were not copied in the ordinary way, that is under the direction of M. Richard or of Dr. Brymner, but they are in the archives and are given out as copies of the originals, while the only reliable copy in Canada is in Vol. IV of the *Siege*. The Ottawa copies are being corrected however at the present time. Over 126 pages of type had to be set up again, as the type had been distributed when the errors were discovered, so that this series of letters although well-known has only been corrected though the publication of this work.

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There is only one more item to which I desire to call

attention, namely, the Russian dispatches. I made no claim for these documents beyond the fact that they were previously unknown.

The Editor of *Old and New* refers to them in these words :

" The MSS. bearing on the siege that were found in Moscow, extracts from which are given in volume IV. (Appendix, Part I.), are said to have been addressed (mainly during the summer and fall of 1759) to the Empress Catherine II. The translation from Russian to French was made, we are told, under direction of Prince Galitzine. This statement makes it all the harder to account for the curious anachronism that characterizes the whole series. No. I., for instance, reads in English as follows :—" Extract from a despatch of the 14th. of October, 1759, No. 43, to the Empress Catherine II., by the Count Michael Bestoujeff Rumine, ambassador of Russia at Paris." Then follows a report of the taking of Quebec, beginning thus : " Hier soir le bruit s'est repandu ici, comme quoi la ville de Québec a été prise par les Anglais, etc.," as if the cable were in full swing. This peculiarity, with the additional fact that Catherine II did not ascend the throne until nearly three years later, tends to puzzle the simple-minded reader. It is quite possible that, in making the extracts, the officials who carried out Prince Galitzine's directions, adapted the record in the journal, wherein, of course, the entry of a distant event was made days, weeks or months after its occurrence, to the usage of an age in which a diarist may jot down at night what happened in China, Cairo or Madrid in the morning. The dislocation, however, when it comes to years, we cannot pretend to rectify. That an educated Russian should suppose a despatch of October 14, 1759, to have been

addressed to the Empress Catherine II., is as if a historian were to credit a despatch of 1897 or 1898 to the reign of King Edward VII., and quote it as addressed to His Majesty. Which, as Euclid says, is absurd."

Now what is the history of these documents which are so mysterious to my critic.

When the late abbé Verreau was in Quebec, examining certain documents which are published in the *Siege* he was asked if he thought there might by any papers in the Russian documents mentioned by him, (which by the way had been indicated in a bibliography already) and he said it was impossible to tell. Monseigneur Laflamme, however, thought that there were some documents relating to the period and a search was instigated.

After a very interesting correspondence extending over 15 months, the papers published in Vol. IV. were located in Moscow in the custody of Prince Galitzine. Monseigneur Laflamme, while visiting Russia with the late abbé Verreau, had become acquainted with the family of Prince Galitzine, and he therefore kindly consented to supplement the request of the authors for copies of the papers. In the course of time the copies which I have before me were sent to the University of Laval with two very courteous letters, one addressed to the Rector and one to the authors.

The documents were translated chiefly from the Russian, and signed by the translator, under whose signature appears this certificate in the handwriting of the Prince "Par copie conforme Pce P. Galitzine."

It would appear from the information given that many of the original dispatches are of considerable length, and only those portions which relate to Quebec have been copied.

The first extract dated at Paris, October 14, 1754, reads as follows :—" Hier soir le bruit s'est répandu " ici, comme quoi la ville de Québec a été prise par " les Anglais et que les Français avant de quitter la " ville avaient eu un engagement avec ceux-ci, dans " lequel ils avaient, non seulement subi de grandes " pertes, mais avaient perdu leur général en chef."

Now there is nothing extraordinary in this, although the Editor says it is just as if the cable were in full swing. The news had been circulated the night before and the ambassador gave the Empress the news.

In the other dispatches the ambassador in London evidently repeats the news that was current in the court, and gives us some details which we do not find elsewhere. It is simply a budget of news such as one might gather for a letter. From one dispatch we learn that certain news was brought to Pitt at 9 o'clock the night before, the writer evidently wishing to be very exact. The ambassador in another instance gives the greater part of Wolfe's letter, of Sept. 2nd ; and Townshend's letter of the 20th. of Sept. is given in full. In fact it is evident that they gave the Empress all the news they could gather, and the dispatches are not without interest to-day.

After having taken objection to the style of the dispatches, with which we have nothing to do, the Editor thinks that he has discredited the documents when he insinuates that Prince Galitzine is not an educated Russian.

" That an educated Russian should suppose a dispatch of 14th. of October, 1759, was addressed to the Empress Catherine, is as if a historian were to credit a dispatch of 1897 or 1898 to the reign of King Edward VII and quote it as addressed to His Majesty, which as Euclid says is absurd."

Now the absurdity does not lie in such a supposition, but in the remarks of my critic.

It is quite true that the grand Duchess Catherine did not ascend the throne until 1762, three years after the date of the dispatches, and this fact is recorded in all the standard histories of Russia. It is not always safe to trust to standard works of history, and practically dangerous in this case do so.

Catherine did not ascend the throne and was not legally proclaimed Empress until 1762, but as a distinguished Russian his said : " Le trône de Russie n'est ni héréditaire ni électif, il est occupatif." As early as 1756, Catherine began to usurp the powers of Elizabeth, and in this year she borrowed of the British government no less them 50,000 roubles.

" Waliszewski, in his work crowned by the French Academy (Paris 1894) written from documents hitherto unknown which be discovered in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and France, states on page 96 :

" Après avoir donné le jour à l'héritier du trône, Catherine n'eut pas seulement à subir les bizarres traitements que nous avons dit ; elle se trouva encore, par le fait même de cette naissance, reléguée au second plan, et pour ainsi dire amoindrie et déchue. Elle demeurait un personnage de haut rang, mais plutôt de grand apparat que de grande importance.

Elle avait cessé d'être la condition *sine qua non* du programme dynastique, l'être nécessaire sur lequel tout le monde, depuis l'impératrice jusqu'au plus humble sujet de l'empire, tenait les yeux fixés, dans l'attente du grand événement. Elle avait accompli sa tâche.

C'est pourtant peu après cet événement décisif

qu'elle en arrivait peu à peu à assumer un rôle comme aucune grande duchesse n'en avait jamais joué ni n'en devait jouer après elle en Russie. Ce que fut la " jeune cour ", ainsi appelée, celle de Pierre et de Catherine, pendant une période de six ans, allant de 1755 jusqu'au 5 janvier 1762, jour de la mort d'Elisabeth, rien dans l'histoire d'aucun autre pays, ni de la Russie elle-même à une autre époque, n'en peut donner l'idée. A certains moments, les diplomates envoyés à Saint-Petersbourg purent se trouver dans l'embarras pour savoir à quelle porte ils devaient s'adresser, d'aucuns n'hésitèrent pas et allèrent bravement frapper à la petite porte : Hanbury Williams, l'envoyé anglais, fut de ce nombre."

" En 1755, l'Angleterre, désireuse de renouveler le traité de subsides..... envoyait à Saint-Petersbourg un nouvel ambassadeur..... ce fut Sir Charles Hanbury Williams..... Ses assiduités auprès d'Elizabeth paraissaient fort agréables à la souveraine, mais restaient de nul effet, politiquement parlant. Voulait-il aborder le terrain positif d'une négotiation quelconque, la tzarine s'esquivait. Il avait beau chercher l'impératrice, il ne rencontrait qu'une aimable danseuse de menuet, parfois une bacchante. Il en arriva, au bout de quelques mois, à conclure qu'Elizabeth n'était pas une femme avec laquelle on pût causer sérieusement et il songea à se retourner. Rebuté par le présent, il pensa à l'avenir. L'avenir, c'était la jeune cour."

And Professor Richard Lange, of the University of St. Petersbourg, when applied to for information concerning the last days of the reign of the Empress Elizabeth, wrote : " I think that you are right in " assuming that *de facto* during the last 2-3 years " of the reign of Elizabeth, Catherine was at the " head of affairs ".

However, some interesting facts, found in documents, will be brought to light in an article which is being prepared for a Review upon the last days of the Empress Elizabeth.

I could multiply instances indefinitely to demonstrate that I was supported by authority for every statement which I made in my review; my article was written with a conscientious desire to do justice to a work, which only those who are thoroughly conversant with the nature and value of the material published, can appreciate. I said in the first part of my article that many historial points were settled by this work and I will enumerate some of them, which are quite apart from the general information which is augmented by this publication.

1. The exact number of the forces under Wolfe.
2. The authorship of the plan by which Quebec was taken.
3. The responsibility for the capitulation.
4. The site of the battle.

In connection with this last question, I may say that the publication of this work has been the indirect means of making known to students a precious collection of plans of Canada, for it was through the indication in the bibliography, that His Excellency the Earl of Minto caused a search to be instituted which resulted, not only in finding the original plans of the battle of the Plains bearing the signatures of Wolfe's officers, and their reports, but also of over eighty plans relating to the city of Quebec.

I did not claim for the work any special merit as a literary production, but I maintain that the work stands unrivalled as a collection of reliable data concerning this important period of Canadian history and there was justification for the publication of every document.

The vast amount of data concerning the old regime and the early days of British rule which has been brought to light by various students during the last ten years, renders the work of a critic very difficult, because much much of the material made use of by modern writers is not to be found in accepted channels. Three distinguished writers on historical subjects, Dr Ward, Master of Peterhouse ; Dr Prothero, formerly Professor of History in Edinburgh University ; and Stanley Leathes, Lecturer in Trinity College, evidently appreciated these difficulties with regard to European history, when they incorporated the following words in the preface to the Cambridge Modern History : "It has become impossible for "the historical writer of the present ago to trust "without reserve even to the most respected second-"ary authorities. The honest student finds himself "continually deserted, retarded, misled by the clas-"sics of history, and has to hew his own way "through multitudinous transactions, periodicals "and official publications, in order to reach the "truth ".

These remarks are applicable to Canadian history.

My critic apparently trusts too much to the classics of our history, but the time is not far distant when the history of Canada, both of the old and of the new regime, will undergo a complete revision, and steps are already being taken for the accomplishment of such a desirable work.

N. E. DIONNE

Quebec, June, 1903.